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EMPLOYEES AS SUBCONTRACTORS: MARYlAND'S INTERPRE-
TATION OF ITS MECHANICS' LIENS STATUTE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A sprinkler-fitter puts in a lengthy and arduous forty-hour week. He 
has spent long, tedious hours installing a fire sprinkler system with his 
co-workers. At the end of the week, he gets his reward for dealing 
with the rigorous demands of his job-a paycheck. 
When the fitter goes to the bank to cash his paycheck, he finds that 
there are insufficient funds in his employer's account to cover his 
check. The fitter has no money to pay for his mortgage, car payment, 
or any of his other bills. He attempts to collect the money from his 
employer, but is ultimately unsuccessful. 
The fitter, along with his co-workers, who experienced the same 
problem, seek legal advice and decide to place a mechanics' lien 1 on 
the property that they have worked so diligently to improve. A 
mechanics' lien is a way for contractors, subcontractors, materialmen, 
and laborers to secure the cost of the labor and materials that they 
have exhausted while enhancing a piece of property.2 When they file 
the lien, the fitters discover that their employer has contractually 
waived the company's right to place a lien against the property. It is 
now in the court's discretion to determine whether the fitters are eli-
gible for relief via a mechanics' lien, or whether their employer 
waived their rights. 
In Judd Fire Protection, Inc. v. Davidson, Maryland addressed the issue 
of whether employees of a sub-subcontractor could bring suit against a 
subcontractor under Maryland's Mechanics' Lien statute when the 
sub-subcontractor had waived its right to a mechanics' lien.3 The 
1. A mechanics' lien is: 
A statutory lien that secures payment for labor or materials sup-
plied in improving, repairing, or maintaining real or personal 
property, such as a building, an automobile, or the like. - Also 
termed artisan's lien; chatte1lien (for personal property); construc-
tion lien (for labor); garageman's lien (for repaired vehicles); la-
borer's lien (for labor); materialman's lien (for materials). 
BlACK'S LAw DICfIONARY 935 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis omitted). 
2. See S. BLOOM, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF MECHANICS' LIENS AND BUILDING 
CONTRACfS § 6 (1910). 
3. 138 Md. App. 654, 656-57, 773 A.2d 573, 575 (2001). A subcontractor is 
"[o]ne who is awarded a portion of an existing contract by a contractor, 
esp. a general contractor." BlACK'S LAw DICfIONARY 1155 (7th ed. 2000). 
A sul>-subcontractor is one who is hired by a subcontractor to do work. Judd 
Fire Prot., Inc., 138 Md. App. at 656-57, 773 A.2d at 575. The employees in 
Judd Fire Protection, Inc. worked for the sul>-subcontractors. Id. For the pur-
poses of this comment, sul>-subcontractors and subcontractors are used in-
97 
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Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that employees of a sub-
contractor could be considered subcontractors themselves, and any 
waiver of mechanics' liens made by the subcontractor would not apply 
to its employees.4 
This comment will discuss several aspects surrounding the Judd Fire 
Protection, Inc. decision. Part II.A. discusses the purpose behind the 
mechanics' lien statute. Part II.B. addresses the procedures for claim-
ing a mechanics' lien. Part II.C. addresses the rights that subcontrac-
tor employees have to obtain mechanics' liens. Part II.D. discusses, in 
detail, the court's decision in Judd Fire Protection, Inc. Part llI.A. ana-
lyzes the court of special appeals' decision, which held that employees 
of the subcontractor had standing as subcontractors and, therefore, 
could file for a mechanics' lien. Part III.B. compares the Judd Fire 
Protection, Inc. decision with similar cases in other jurisdictions. Part 
III.C. examines the Judd Fire Protection, Inc. decision in light of the leg-
islative intent underlying Maryland's mechanics' lien statute. Finally, 
Part IV concludes that the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland was 
correct in the Judd Fire Protection, Inc. holding, which allowed employ-
ees to gain subcontractor status for purposes of obtaining a mechan-
ics' lien. 
II. THE EXISTENCE AND FUNCTIONS OF MECHANICS' LIENS 
A. The Purpose Behind Mechanics' Liens 
Mechanics' liens were disregarded at common law.5 The view was 
that once a laborer or materialman gave his labor or materials to an-
other, he then relinquished ownership of these things.6 In 1791, Ma-
ryland passed the first mechanics' lien law in the United States.7 The 
law's purpose was to assure workers payment for their labor and to 
promote the speedy construction of Washington, D.c.s Throughout 
the late-eighteenth to early-nineteenth centuries other states began to 
adopt statutory law to establish mechanics' liens.9 Presently, alljuris-
terchangeablyas the court did not distinguish between the two. Id. at 660-
70, 773 A.2d at 576-83. 
4. Id. at 665, 773 A.2d at 580. 
5. Samuel L. Phillips, A Treatise on the Law of Mechanics' Liens on Real and 
Personal Property § 1 (Boston et aI., 2d ed. 1883). 
6. See id. 
7. JUSTIN SWEET, LEGAL AsPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CON-
STRUcrION PROCESS 641 (West Publishing Co. 5th ed. 1994) (1970). Cur-
rently Maryland's mechanics' lien statute consists of one subtitle of the Real 
Property section of the Maryland Annotated Code, which is appended in its 
entirety. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 9-101 to 9-114 (2003). 
8. See SWEET, supra note 7, at 64l. 
9. See PHILLIPS, supra note 5, § 7. 
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dictions in the United States have some type of mechanics' lien 
statute. 10 
The purposes of mechanics' liens statutes are "to provide security of 
payment for the suppliers of labor and materials on construction 
projects and to facilitate credit in the construction industry," I I as well 
as to protect against unjust enrichment.12 A mechanics' lien is a statu-
tory right to a claim against property given to a laborer or material-
man who improves a property regardless of any contractual privity the 
laborer may have with the owner or contractor. 13 Liens enhance a 
laborer's position with an owner or contractor when attempting to 
obtain payment for services rendered or materials supplied because 
the lien encumbers the owner's property, making it difficult to sell or 
borrow against. 14 The property may then be sold to satisfy the lien, 
giving the injured laborer or materialman his relief. 15 
B. The Procedures for Claiming a Mechanics' Lien 
To claim a lien against a property after nonpayment, a laborer must 
file documents with the state's land registry officeI6 or, as is the case in 
Maryland, with the clerk of the appropriate county's circuit court. 17 
Many states, including Maryland, require that the laborer provide the 
owner with a Notice of Intent regarding the mechanics' lien. 18 Some 
states' mechanics' lien statutes have a time limitation for filing a peti-
tion for a lien claim and Notice of Intent to the owner.19 If the la-
borer does not file these documents within the requisite time, the 
laborer can lose his claim to a mechanics' lien,20 but he may still have 
a breach of contract claim against the one who hired him-typically 
10. See BRIAN M. SAMUELS, CONSTRUGrION LAw 99 (Ed Francis ed., Prentice Hall 
1996). 
11. Id. 
12. See SWEET, supra note 7, at 639-40. The theory of unjust enrichment is de-
fined as: "The retention of a benefit conferred by another, without offering 
compensation, in circumstances where compensation is reasonably ex-
pected." BLACK'S LAw DIGrIONARY 1536 (7th ed. 1999). 
13. CONSTRUGrION AND DESIGN LAw § 37.1 (C. Allen Foster et al. eds., 3d ed. 
1998). Privity of contract is "[t]he relationship between the parties to a con-
tract, allowing them to sue each other but preventing a third party from 
doing so." BLACK'S LAw DIGrIONARY 1217 (7th ed. 1999). 
14. See SAMUELS, supra note 10, at 100. 
15. See id. 
16. Id. at 101. 
17. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-105(a) (2003). 
18. See id. § 9-104(a); SAMUELS, supra note 10, at 101. 
19. SAMUELS, supra note 10, at 101. In Maryland, a laborer has 120 days from 
finishing the work to give written Notice of Intent to claim a lien. MD. 
CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-104(a). Maryland also requires that a petition 
for a claim must be filed within 180 days after the work has been finished in 
the circuit court in the county where the land is located. Id. § 9-105(a). 
20. SAMUELS, supra note 10, at 101. 
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the general contractor.2 ! The laborer may also lose his claim if he or 
she does not begin legal proceedings within the statute's established 
time frame. 22 
Once legal action is initiated, the laborer must show that he per-
formed his duties under the contract and that payment was denied to 
him.23 If the court finds that a lien should attach to the property, the 
laborer then becomes a creditor of the owner. 24 The laborer can col-
lect his money in three ways: (1) directly from the owner; (2) wait for 
the land to be sold and collect his money in line with the other credi-
tors to the land (which may mean that he will get very little, if any, 
compensation); or (3) on rare occasion, the laborer may petition the 
court to sell the land to pay for his share of work.25 The route for 
collecting the money simply depends on whether the owner has set up 
any security on the property.26 
C. The Right of Subcontractor Employees to a Mechanics' Lien 
Owners and general contractors usually deal with subcontractors on 
a company level; however, the employees of subcontractors may have 
access to the mechanics' lien statute to claim a lien against the project 
property even though they do not deal directly with the owner or gen-
eral contractor.27 In National Electrical Industry Fund v. Bethlehem Steel 
COrp.,28 the electrical workers union fund filed a mechanics' lien 
against the project property on behalf of its union members.29 Al-
though the court of appeals rejected the union's contention that its 
collective bargaining agreement with the employer gave the union 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
Id. at 100. The lien has more assurance of payment then a breach of con-
tract claim because the general contractor may become insolvent and 
therefore unable to pay the judgment. See id. Because a court may always 
order the sale of the property to satisfy the lien, a valid lien ensures pay-
ment. See id. 
See id. at 102; SWEET, supra note 7, at 642. Maryland requires that a plead-
ing be filed with the petition for a lien to the court, which the court will 
review. MD. CODE fum., REAL PROP. § 9-106(a). 
See SAMUELS, supra note 10, at 102; SWEET, supra note 7, at 642. In Mary-
land, if the petition and pleading of a laborer are found sufficient for the 
court to attach a lien, then the owner has 15 days to show why the lien 
should not be attached. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-106(a). The owner 
only needs to deny the validity of the lien, making the laborer prove its 
validity. F. ScottJay & Co., Inc. v. Vargo, 112 Md. App. 354,361,685 A.2d 
799,803 (1996) (citing Cont'l Steel Corp. v. Sugarman, 266 Md. 541, 295 
A.2d 493 (1972». 
See SAMUELS, supra note 10, at 102. 
See id. at 102; SWEET, supra note 7, at 642. Maryland allows the laborer to 
enforce a mechanics' lien on a property one year from the time the peti-
tion for a lien was filed. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-109. 
See SAMUELS, supra note 10, at 102; SWEET, supra note 7, at 642. 
See Judd Fire Prot., Inc., 138 Md. App. at 660, 773 A.2d at 577. 
296 Md. 541, 463 A.2d 858 (1983). 
Id. at 544, 463 A.2d at 859. 
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standing to file for a mechanics' lien,30 the court did determine that 
each employee had an individual contract with the employerY The 
individual contracts gave each electrical worker subcontractor status, 
and it gave them the right to claim a mechanics' lien against the 
property. 32 
As demonstrated in the Nebraska case Omaha Construction Industry 
Pension Plan v. Children's Hospital, even when there are no individual 
contracts, employees of a subcontractor may still have the right to 
claim a mechanics' lien on the project property.33 In Omaha, union 
employees of a subcontractor attempted to assert a construction lien 
(construction-industry mechanics' lien) against the owner's property 
for labor rendered on the property.34 Nebraska based its Construc-
tion Lien Act on the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act 
("Uniform Act"), which "allows any person, no matter how far re-
moved from the contracting owner, to file a lien for services or materi-
als furnished pursuant to a real estate improvement contract."35 
Although· Nebraska does not follow the Uniform Act verbatim, its 
Construction Lien Act, like the Uniform Act, does not mention any 
prohibition of subcontractor employees filing a mechanics' lien.36 
The Nebraska statute does provide that" [a] person who furnishes 
services or materials pursuant to a real estate improvement contract 
has a construction lien, only to the extent provided in sections 52-125 
to 52-159, to secure the payment of his or her contract price."37 The 
Court of Appeals of Nebraska determined that there was no differ-
ence between the relationship of subcontractor employees to a prop-
erty owner and of a supplier to a property owner.38 The court 
ultimately held that subcontractor employees had the right to obtain a 
mechanics' lien.39 
Other states do not follow the "Nebraska Rule" on mechanics' liens. 
For example, Bender v. Beverly Anne, Inc. examined a subcontractor's 
employees' rights to a mechanics' lien under North Dakota law.40 
Bender was a subcontractor employee who was not paid for his la-
bor.41 In order to collect his money, Bender filed a mechanics' lien 
against the project property.42 The subcontractor, Basic Concrete, 
30. [d. at 545, 463 A.2d at 860. 
31. [d. at 546, 463 A.2d at 860. 
32. [d. at 547-48, 463 A.2d at 861. 
33. 642 N.W.2d 849 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002). 
34. [d. at 852. 
35. [d. 
36. See id. 
37. NEB. REv. STAT. § 52-131 (1998). 
38. Omaha Constr. Indus. Pension Plan, 642 N.W.2d at 853. 
39. [d. at 853, 855. 
40. 651 N.w.2d 642 (N.D. 2002). 
41. [d. 
42. Id. at 644. 
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Inc., had already released its rights to a mechanics' lien before Bender 
filed his claim.43 
North Dakota's mechanics' lien statute provides that any person 
who contributes labor and is under contract with the owner, agent, 
trustee, contractor, or subcontractor has a right to a lien.44 The Su-
preme Court of North Dakota affirmed the trial court's decision that 
Bender did not have a claim under the statute.45 The trial court rea-
soned that Bender was an employee because he was in privity with the 
subcontractor and not an actual subcontractor under the statute.46 
Bender argued that there are two systems of mechanics' liens stat-
utes, the Pennsylvania system and the New York system.47 Bender con-
tended that North Dakota followed the Pennsylvania system, which 
reasoned that "a laborer's right to a lien does not depend on the exis-
tence of a debt due from the owner to the contractor."48 The court 
disagreed with Bender's contention49 and looked instead to the New 
York system, under which "a laborer's lien depends on an amount re-
maining due to the contractor .... "50 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota examined the North Dakota 
Century Code section 35-27-02, which states: "If the owner or agent 
has paid the full price or value of the contribution, no lien is al-
lowed."51 Once Basic Concrete dismissed its claim against Beverly 
Anne, Inc., it settled any outstanding payments, and the court held 
that any mechanics' lien filed after that point would be void, includ-
ing Bender's.52 
D. The Instant Case: Judd Fire Protection, Inc. v. Davidson 
Judd Fire Protection, Inc. presented the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland with a case in which a subcontractor's employees filed a 
claim for a mechanics' lien.53 Unlike National Electrical Industry Fund 
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., the employees did not have individual employ-
ment contracts with the subcontractor. 54 Without individual employ-
ment contracts, the court of special appeals examined the possibility 
43. Id. 
44. N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-27-02 (1987). 
45. Bender, 651 N.W.2d at 646. 
46. Id. at 644-45. 
47. Id. at 646. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
5l. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-27-02 (1987)). 
52. Id. 
53. 138 Md. App. 654, 658, 773 A.2d 573, 576 (2001). 
54. Id. at 662, 773 A.2d at 578; see also Nat'l Elee. Indus. Fund, 296 Md. 541, 546, 
463 A.2d 858, 860 (1983). 
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of subcontractor employees being viewed as subcontractors them-
selves, as Nebraska and North Dakota would do a year later.55 
This examination of mechanics' liens stemmed from an accelera-
tion of a contract between the general contractor, Whiting-Turner, 
Inc., and its subcontractor, Judd Fire Protection, Inc., for the installa-
tion of a fire sprinkler system.56 Judd hired SDR Fire Protection as a 
subcontractor because it could not complete the contract work within 
the project's accelerated time schedule.57 Mter a percentage of the 
work was completed, SDR's employees walked off of the project site 
because SDR had insufficient funds in its account to cover their 
paychecks. 58 
Although SDR failed to complete the project, Judd paid it for the 
completed work and SDR signed a Lien Release.59 SDR's Lien Re-
lease stated that materialmen could not claim a lien against the prop-
erty or Judd, but similar releases were never obtained from the 
employees themselves.60 Many of SDR's employees attempted to col-
lect their wages by filing suits against SDR.61 Although they were suc-
cessful in obtaining judgments, the employees were unable to collect 
from SDR.62 
As a result, ten employees filed a petition for a mechanics' lien 
against the property.63 Judd, on behalf of the owner and general con-
tractor, filed an answer to the employees' petition.64 The trial court 
found in favor of the employees and held that they were "entitled to 
recover the reasonable value of the services rendered in each instance 
by each employee considered separately."65 
Judd appealed the decision to the Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land.66 Judd's main contention was that the employees did not have 
standing to bring the case because they personally were not subcon-
tractors.67 The court looked to the mechanics' lien statute and found 
that it allows "a creditor for labor or materials to proceed in rem 
55. Judd Fire Prot., Inc., 138 Md. App. at 662-63, 773 A.2d at 578; see also Omaha 
Constr. Indus. Pension Plan v. Children's Hosp., 642 N.W.2d 849, 855 
(Neb. Ct. App. 2002); Bender, 651 N.W.2d at 646 (dismissing Bender's com-
plaint and ordering the mechanics' lien stricken). 
56. Judd Fire Prot., Inc., 138 Md. App. at 656-57, 773 A.2d at 574-75. 
57. Id. at 657, 773 A.2d at 575. 
58. Id. at 658, 773 A.2d at 575. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 658, 773 A.2d at 576. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 659, 773 A.2d at 576. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 656, 773 A.2d at 574-75. 
67. Id. at 660-61, 773 A.2d at 577 (explaining that Judd alleged that the ten 
employees did not satisfy the statutory definition of standing). 
104 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 33 
against improved property even though he could show no privity of 
contract with the owner, nor personal liability of the owner to him."68 
The court determined that although there were no formal agree-
ments between the employees and SDR, there were still written, oral, 
and implied contracts to perform work at the project site.69 These 
agreements provided that the employees would supply the labor for 
the project and, in turn, SDR would pay them for their work.70 The 
court noted that" [a] subcontractor is defined as 'a person who has a 
contract with anyone except the owner or his agent.' "71 Based on the 
statute, the court concluded that the employees were subcontractors 
and could file for a mechanics' lien.72 
Judd Fire Protection, Inc. was further complicated because Judd paid 
SDR for its services. 73 SDR then signed a Lien Release, but never paid 
its employees.74 The court looked to state policy and recognized that 
mechanics' lien law is normally construed "in the most liberal and 
comprehensive manner in favor of mechanics and materialmen."75 
Even though the court acknowledged that Judd would pay twice the 
amount, once to SDR and once to SDR's employees, it held that the 
employees were not parties to the lien release and they were entitled 
to bring a claim for a mechanics' lien.76 
68. Id. at 660, 773 A.2d at 577 (quoting Wolf Org. V. Oles, 119 Md. App. 357, 
36~7, 705 A.2d 40 (1998) (citations omitted». 
69. Id. at 663, 773 A.2d at 578. There are two types of implied contracts, an 
implied-in-fact contract and an implied-in-Iaw contract (also known as a 
quasi-contract). BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 322 (7th ed. 1999). In Judd Fire 
Protection, Inc., an implied-in-Iaw contract exists, that is: 
An obligation imposed by law because of the conduct of the par-
ties, or some special relationship between them, or because one of 
them would otherwise be unjustly enriched. An implied-in-Iaw con-
tract is not actually a contract, but instead a remedy that allows the 
plaintiff to recover a benefit conferred on the defendant. 
Id. This is different from an express contract, which is "[a] contract whose 
terms the parties have explicitly set out." Id. at 321. 
70. Judd Fire Prot., Inc., 138 Md. App. at 663, 773 A.2d at 578. 
71. Id. at 662,773 A.2d at 578 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-101 (g) 
(1996» . 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 663, 773 A.2d at 578. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 664,773 A.2d at 579 (quoting Winkler Constr. Co. v.Jerome, 355 Md. 
231,246,734 A.2d 212, 221 (1999) (citations omitted». 
76. /d. at 665, 773 A.2d at 579. 
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III. MARYLAND'S INTERPRETATION OF ITS MECHANICS' LIEN 
STATUTE 
A. The Court oj Special Appeals oj Maryland Correctly Held that the Subcon-
tractor Employees were Subcontractors Under the Maryland Mechanics' 
Lien Statute 
In Judd Fire Protection, Inc., the court of special appeals looked to 
cases such as National Electrical Industry Fund to determine whether 
subcontractor employees should be considered subcontractors them-
selves.77 In National Electrical Industry Fund, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland determined that the Maryland mechanics' lien statute gave 
employees the right to claim mechanics' liens when individual em-
ployment agreements were formed between them and the subcontrac-
tor. 78 The court in Judd Fire Protection, Inc., applying the holding in 
National Electrical Industry Fund, held that an implied employment 
agreement between a subcontractor and employee may exist simply by 
an agreement to improve the property.79 
Similar cases have arisen in other jurisdictions requiring the courts 
to determine whether or not an employment agreement made con-
tractors' or subcontractors' employees similar to subcontractors them-
selves under their state's statutes. In Amick v. C&T Development Co., a 
contractor failed to pay its employees, resulting in the employees fil-
ing a mechanics' lien against the project owner's property.80 The Su-
preme Court of Appeals of West Virginia determined that "an 
employee shall have the same lien and other rights and remedies for 
the enforcement of his claim of liquidated damages as he would have 
been entitled to had he actually rendered service therefore in the 
manner as last employed."81 The court applied West Virginia's 
mechanics' lien laws to this case by analyzing West Virginia Code sec-
tion 38-2-6, which provides that employees of contractors and subcon-
tractors have the right to a lien.82 State law, therefore, supported the 
77. See id. at 661-62, 773 A.2d at 577-78. 
78. See Nat'l Elec. Indus. Fund v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 296 Md. 541, 552, 463 
A.2d 858, 863 (1983). 
79. See Judd Fire Prot., Inc., 138 Md. App. at 662-63, 773 A.2d at 578. 
80. 416 S.E.2d 73, 74 (W. Va. 1992). 
81. Id. at 76 (citing Farley v. Zapata Coal Corp., 281 S.E.2d 238, 242 (W. Va. 
1981». 
82. Id. See also W. VA. CODE § 38-2-6 (1997). This section of the West Virginia 
Code specifically states: 
Every workman, artisan, mechanic, laborer or other person who 
performs any work or labor or provides any service under the em-
ployment of any general contractor or of any subcontractor in the 
erection, construction, repair or removal of any building or other 
structure, or improvement appurtenant thereto, or who alters or 
improves the real property whereon the same stands, or to which it 
may have been removed, necessary to the completion of such gen-
eral contract, shall have such a lien for his or her compensation as 
is mentioned in section one of this article. 
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court's holding that a contractor's employees could claim a mechan-
ics' lien against the improved property.83 
In Rutenberg-Sarasota, Ltd. v. Eisner, the District Court of Appeal of 
Florida also addressed the issue of a subcontractor's employee having 
a right to a lien.84 The court determined that privity between a la-
borer and owner was not needed to claim a lien.85 In applying Flor-
ida's mechanics' lien statute, the court determined that a proper 
contract to improve property must be present before a lien can be 
claimed.86 The Rutenberg-Sarasota, Ltd. court held that a proper con-
tract can exist between a subcontractor and a laborer.87 The court 
found that a proper contract did exist in this case and the laborers 
were entitled to claim a mechanics' lien under Florida law.88 
In Stepuncik v. Michalek, the Appellate Court of Illinois also deter-
mined that an employee of a contractor or subcontractor was entitled 
to a lien.89 In Stepuncik, the general contractor failed to pay a carpen-
ter employee and the carpenter filed a lien against the project prop-
erty.90 The Stepuncik court had to determine whether an employee of 
a contractor was entitled to file for a lien.91 The court concluded that 
the employee was considered a subcontractor for the purpose of 
bringing a lien because there was no statutory exclusion stating 
otherwise.92 
Id. 
83. Amick, 416 S.E.2d at 76. 
84. 509 So.2d 398, 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
85. Id. at 400. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. The Florida mechanics' lien law defines a "contract" as "an agreement 
for improving real property, written or unwritten, express or implied, and 
includes extras or change orders." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 713.01 (6) (West 
2000). A laborer is "any person other than an architect, landscape archi-
tect, engineer, sUIveyor and mapper, and the like who, under properly au-
thorized contract, personally performs on the site of the improvement 
labor or services for improving real property and does not furnish materials 
or labor service of others." Id. § 713.01(15). "Laborer" is included under 
Florida's definition of lienor. Id. § 713.01 (17). 
89. 384 N.E.2d 526, 527 (Ill. App. 1978). 
90. Id. at 526. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 527. Illinois' mechanics' lien statutes defines someone who can claim 
a lien as: 
Any person who shall by any contract or contracts, express or im-
plied, or partly expressed or implied, with the owner of a lot or 
tract of land, or with one whom the owner has authorized or know-
ingly permitted to contract, to improve the lot or tract of land or to 
manage a structure thereon ... furnish or perform labor or ser-
vices as superintendent, time keeper, mechanic, laborer or other-
wise, in the building, altering, repairing or ornamenting of the 
same ... is known under this Act as a contractor, and has a lien 
upon the whole of such lot of tract of land. 
770 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 60/1-1 (West 2001). 
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Some jurisdictions, such as the District of Columbia, have yet to de-
termine whether a subcontractor employee would be entitled to bring 
a claim for a mechanics' lien. Under D.C.'s mechanics' lien statute, 
those allowed to bring a claim for a lien are those who are "directly 
employed" by the original contractor.93 Although D.C. allows subcon-
tractors to bring lien claims, it does not allow subcontractors of sub-
contractors to bring such claims.94 It is undecided whether D.C. 
would allow an employee of a subcontractor to bring a claim for a 
lien. It seems unlikely, however, that D.C. would extend its mechan-
ics' lien statute to that of a sub-subcontractor's employees, as was done 
in Judd Fire Protection, Inc.,95 when it will not even extend the statute to 
the sub-subcontractor.96 
Although some jurisdictions would prefer not to extend the lien 
privilege too far from the original contract,97 most jurisdictions be-
lieve that laborers for contractors and subcontractors should be pro-
vided with some means of "security of payment" for work performed, 
regardless of how far removed they are from the original contract.98 
Maryland's mechanics' lien statute is not as obvious as West Virginia's 
with respect to defining who may claim a mechanics' lien,99 but it is 
similar to Nebraska's and Florida's statutes. IOO Section 9-101 (g) of 
Maryland's Real Property Code defines a subcontractor as "a person 
who has a contract with anyone except the owner or his agent,"IOI 
whereas Nebraska's entitles someone who "furnishes services" for the 
improvement of property to a construction lien.102 Although Flor-
ida's mechanics' lien statute's language is a bit narrower than Mary-
land's and Nebraska's,103 the Florida courts apply the same broad 
interpretation.104 Judd Fire Protection, Inc., therefore, followed the ma-
jority of jurisdictions in allowing the employees the right to bring the 
lien. 105 
93. D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-303.01 (2001). 
94. Battista v. Horton, Meyers, & Raymond, 128 F.2d 29, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1942). 
95. See generally Judd Fire Prot., Inc., 138 Md. App. 654, 773 A.2d 573 (2001). 
96. See supra note 92. 
97. See supra notes 90-91. 
98. See Rutenberg-Sarasota, Ltd. v. Eisner, 509 So.2d 398, 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1987); Stepuncik v. Michalek, 384 N.E.2d 526, 526 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); 
Omaha Constr. Indus. Pension Plan v. Children's Hosp., 642 N.W.2d 849, 
852 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002); Amick v. C&T Dev. Co., 416 S.E.2d 73 (w. Va. 
1992); SAMUELS, supra note 10, at 99. 
99. Compare infra Appendix with supra note 82. 
100. Compare infra Appendix with supra notes 37 & 88. 
101. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-101 (g) (2003). 
102. NEB. REv. STAT. § 52.131(1) (1998). 
103. FLA. STAT. A.,"IN. § 713.01(17) (West 2000). See also supra notes 102; infra 
Appendix. 
104. See generally Florida Fruit Co. v. Shakelford, 198 So. 841, 842 (Fla. 1940); see 
also Rutenberg-Sarasota, Ltd. v. Eisner, 509 So.2d 398, 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1987). 
105. See 138 Md. App. 654, 773 A.2d 573. 
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Judd Fire Protection, Inc. also moved away from the archaic disposition 
that "there must be an express contract entered into before the com-
mencement of the work, and not a claim arising from an implied con-
tract in order to give the workman a lien."106 Additionally, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland recognized that some form of a contract must 
exist between the laborer and the subcontractor. 107 
The Maryland mechanics' lien statute expands on the written agree-
ment in National Electrical Industry Fund by defining a contract as "an 
agreement of any kind or nature, express or implied, for doing work 
or furnishing material, or both, for or about a building as may give 
rise to a lien."108 Maryland's statute is consistent with other jurisdic-
tions, such as Iowa, that have decided that an implied contract was 
sufficient for an employee to bring a lien claim. 109 The theory that 
"the [mechanics' lien] statute becomes as much a part of every con-
tract of employment coming within its purview as if its provisions were 
written into the contract between the parties" is often followed in 
other jurisdictions.110 This theory was followed in Judd Fire Protection, 
Inc., where the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland correctly held 
that the sub-subcontractor's employees had as valid a right to a lien 
claim as the subcontractors themselvesY1 
B. Maryland's Interpretation oj the Effect oj a Third Party's Lien Release is 
Comparable to that oj Other Jurisdictions 
Although the court in Judd Fire Protection, Inc. established that the 
employees were subcontractors within the definition provided under 
the Maryland mechanics' lien statute, owners still have several options 
to protect themselves from potential liens against their property.112 
Some states give owners the opportunity to establish what is known as 
a "no lien" contract. 113 A "no lien" contract is essentially a waiver of a 
contractor's right to put a lien on the owner's property that the gen-
eral contractor then passes on in his contracts with subcontractors, 
laborers, and materialmen. l14 Some states, including Maryland, do 
106. PHILLIPS, supra note 5, § 120. 
107. Judd Fire Prot., Inc., 138 Md. App. at 663, 773 A.2d at 578 (following Nat'l 
Elec. Indus. Fund v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 296 Md. 541, 547-48, 463 A.2d 
848,861 (1983». 
108. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-101(c) (2003). 
109. Roger W. Stone, Mechanic's Liens in Iowa - Revisited, 49 DRAKE L. REv. 1, 5 
(2000) (citing IOWA CODE § 572.2 (1999»; Clemens Graf Droste Zu Vis-
chering v. Kading, 368 N.W.2d 702, 708 (Iowa 1985); Giese Constr. Co. v. 
Randa, 524 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). 
110. Florida Fruit Co. v. Shackelford, 198 So. 842, 842 (Fla. 1940). 
111. See 138 Md. App. at 663, 773 A.2d 578. 
112. See id. at 665-66, 773 A.2d at 580. 
113. See generally CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN LAw, supra note 13, § 37.6a.;JUSTIN 
SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION LAw 385 (A.B.A. 1997). 
114. See generally CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN LAw, supra note 13; SWEET, supra 
note 113, at 385. 
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not allow lien waivers in contracts between subcontractors and general 
contractors.115 An owner or general contractor may also attempt to 
get lien waivers when progress payments are made or when the final 
paymen t is received,116 as occurred in Judd Fire Protection, Inc. 11 7 
In Judd Fire Protection, Inc., SDR, the subcontractor, released its right 
to a lien,118 which put the court of special appeals in a position to 
decide whether this lien release applied to the subcontractor's em-
ployees as well. 119 One theory used in the determination was that sub-
contractors should have the same rights afforded to general 
contractors. 120 Thus, if a general contractor waived its rights to a lien 
in the original contract with the owner, then the subcontractor would 
be bound to follow such provisions. 121 
The theory that a subcontractor's lien rights can be waived through 
the provisions of the original contract between contractor and owner 
has since been replaced; a general "contractor and owner cannot de-
prive the material man of his lien by introducing a stipulation into the 
building contract, by which the [general] contractor agrees to indem-
nifY the owner against any lien by persons furnishing materials to be 
used in the construction of the building."122 The same argument can 
be made for laborers in that "the contract between the contractors 
and owner, by which the [laborers] were not to have a lien, was a 
contract that third persons should not have the benefit of a statute 
made expressly for them, and therefore void as to third persons 
.... "123 Judd Fire Protection, Inc. exemplifies this in stating that 
because the employees were not parties to the lien release, SDR's re-
lease did not deprive them of their rights. 124 
Because SDR's employees were considered subcontractors under 
the provisions of the Maryland mechanics' lien statute, lien releases 
should have been collected from each of them to preclude the em-
ployees from bringing a lien.125 The court was correct in holding that 
115. 
116. 
117. 
118. 
119. 
120. 
12l. 
122. 
123. 
124. 
125. 
See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7034(b) (West 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 49-33 (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2706 (1989); MD. CODE 
ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-113 (2003); N.Y. LIEN LAw § 34 (McKinney 1993); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-12(f) (2002). 
See CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN LAw, supra note 13, § 37.6a. 
See 138 Md. App. at 658, 773 A.2d at 5'75. 
See id. 
See id. at 665, 773 A.2d at 580. 
See Bowen v. Aubrey, 22 Cal. 566, 570-71 (1863). 
See id. at 57l. 
Whittierv. Wilbur, 48 Cal. 175, 177-78 (1874). 
[d. at 176-77. Simple reference to the terms of the original contract be-
tween the owner and general contractor, where there is a waiver of 
mechanics' liens, in the contractor-subcontractor contract is not enough to 
apply the lien waiver to the subcontractor. See Robinson v. Herrell Constr. 
Co., 7 Va. Cir. 308 (1986) (citing VNB Mortgage Corp. v. Lone Star Indus., 
Inc., 209 S.E.2d 909,913-14 (1974». 
See 138 Md. App. at 665, 773 A.2d at 579-80. 
See generally MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-113 (2003). 
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the employees lien rights were not waived,126 and is consistent with 
the idea that "[i]t is not competent for the contractor, by any term of 
his contract, or otherwise, to waive, affect, or impair the liens of other 
persons, whether with or without notice, except by their written 
consent." 127 
C. Maryland's Choice to Follow the Pennsylvania System of Mechanics' Liens 
Properly Serves the Legislative Purpose Behind Mechanics' Liens Statutes 
Two standard approaches towards mechanics' liens statutes have 
arisen over the years. These two approaches, discussed earlier in Part 
II.C., are the Pennsylvania system and the New York system. 128 Each 
system has its advantages and disadvantages in resolving claims of 
mechanics' liens, and each state has a different agenda for the system 
they have chosen. 
The New York system limits the amount of money that a laborer can 
collect from an owner to the amount the owner has not yet paid the 
contractor. 129 Under this system, the liens that are brought are deriv-
ative in nature. I30 Discussing the New York system, the court in Jitney-
Jungle Stores of America, Inc. v. United States explained as follows: 
The materialmen or laborers under such a statute are enti-
tled to a lien only when the contractor is entitled to one, and 
there is something due or to become due to the principal 
contractor from the owner. Parties giving this notice have 
no contractual rights other than those possessed by the per-
son or company through which they claim, making them 
more or less subrogation rights. 13I 
The problem with this system is that if the owner pays the contrac-
tor and, in turn, the contractor does not pay the subcontractor, the 
subcontractor is limited in what he can recover. This is especially true 
if the contractor becomes insolvent, in which case the subcontractor 
may not receive payment at all. 132 The advantage to the New York 
system is that owners do not have to fear double payment. 133 
Some states have modified the New York system. Virginia limits the 
amount that the subcontractor can collect from the owner to that 
126. See 138 Md. App. at 665, 773 A.2d at 579-80. 
127. BLOOM, supra note 2, § 65, at 71 (citing Whittier, 48 Cal. at 177-78; Shaver v. 
Murdock, 36 Cal. 293, 298 (1862)). 
128. SWEET, supra note 7, at 64l. 
129. See N.Y. LIEN LAw § 4(1) (McKinney 1993); Bender v. Beverly Anne, Inc., 
651 N.W.2d 642, 646 (N.D. 2002); SWEET, supra note 7, at 641. 
130. See Masten Lumber & Supply Co. v. Brown, 405 A.2d 101, 103-04 (Del. 
1979). 
131. No. ]75-333(N), 1977 WL 1271, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 11, 1977). 
132. See generally id.; Bender, 651 N.W.2d at 646; Judd Fire Prot., Inc., 138 Md. App. 
at 660, 773 A.2d at 577. 
133. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
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which is still due to the general contractor. 134 The Virginia statute 
differs from New York's, in that, under the Virginia statute, the sub-
contractor's claim to a lien is independent of the general contractor 
and not subrogated to the general contractor's rights. 135 
Virginia's mechanics' lien statute also takes on one of the character-
istics of the Pennsylvania system, in that, the subcontractor's claim to a 
mechanics' lien is independent of the general contractor. 136 Under 
the Pennsylvania system, a contract between an owner and a contrac-
tor is like an agency, because the owner is aware that the general con-
tractor will be obtaining subcontractors to do some of the work 
provided for in the contract. 137 According to this theory, the subcon-
tractors are considered to have direct liens against the owner's 
property. 138 
Under the Pennsylvania system, the subcontractor is not limited to 
the amount of money he can collect from the owner, regardless of 
what the owner has already paid the general contractor.139 The prob-
lem with these types of mechanics' liens statutes is the possibility of 
owners paying twice for the same improvements to their property.140 
The advantage over the New York system, however, is that those who 
have performed their duties of improving the owner's property will 
receive full payment for their labors, regardless of the general contrac-
tor's actions. 141 
Although traditionally a Pennsylvania system state with respect to 
commercial properties, Delaware has modified its approach to 
mechanics' liens in situations involving residential properties. 142 
Here, Delaware follows the New York system, in which the lien is lim-
ited by the amount still due to the contractor. 143 As a result, the law 
protects unknowing homeowners from the threat of having their 
property sold to payoff a lien, while still giving laborers their justified 
payment when dealing with commercial owners whose personal 
properties are not at stake.144 
134. SeeVA. CODE ANN. § 43-7 (Michie 2002); Robinson v. Herrell Constr. Co., 7 
Va. Cir. 308, 310-12 (1986). 
135. CompareJitney-Jungle, 1977 WL 1271, at *3, with Robinson, 7 Va. Cir. at 312. 
136. Compare State v. Tabasso Homes, Inc., 28 A.2d 248, 253 (Del. 1942), with 
Robinson, 7 Va. Cir. at 309 (citing VNB Mortgage Corp. v. Lone Star Indus., 
Inc., 209 S.E.2d 909,913 (1974». 
137. Tabasso Homes, Inc., 28 A.2d at 253. 
138. Id. 
139. SWEET, supra note 7, at 641. 
140. See SWEET, supra note 7, at 643. 
141. See generally Tabasso Homes, Inc., 28 A.2d at 252-53. 
142. See Masten Lumber & Supply Co. v. Brown, 405 A.2d 101, 103-04 (Del. 
1979); see also Tabasso Homes, Inc., 28 A.2d at 253. 
143. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2707 (1989); Masten Lumber & Supply, 405 A.2d 
at 104. 
144. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2707; Masten Lumber & Supply, 405 A.2d at 104. 
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Maryland has chosen to exclusively use the Pennsylvania system 
when dealing with mechanics' liens. 145 In so doing, Maryland secures 
laborers' rights to payment for the work they have completed, possibly 
at the expense of the owner who would receive the benefit of their 
work. 146 This was exactly the case in Judd Fire Protection, Inc. 147 
Judd paid SDR for the services it had rendered up until the point of 
the labor problems with SDR's employees, but SDR never passed that 
money on to its employees.148 SDR's employees simply wanted the 
money they were owed, and when they were unsuccessful in recover-
ing their money from SDR, they asserted their statutory rights and 
placed a lien on the project property.149 
The court in Judd Fire Protection, Inc. simply did what the Maryland 
statute provided for when it granted a lien to the employees. 15o Judd 
knew there were labor problems within SDR and, knowing the indus-
try, Judd should have made sure the employees received their 
money.151 
Many have argued that double payment is unjust to the owners and, 
in cases such as Judd Fire Protection, Inc., it should not be the responsi-
bility of the owner to monitor the actions of subcontractors. 152 How-
ever, as stated by the court, "[a]lthough the result may seem harsh, it 
comports with the remedial purposes of the statute and is not so dra-
conian as to raise issues of fundamental unfairness."153 The court ap-
propriately decided to grant the mechanics' lien to the employees 
within the boundaries of Maryland's statute. 154 Although a statute like 
Delaware's may better serve the public in terms of dealing with differ-
ences in residential and commercial properties,155 Maryland's statute 
follows its objective of protecting those who actually improve the 
owner's property.156 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Protecting laborers from nonpayment for work performed has been 
an objective of the Maryland legislature since the eighteenth cen-
tury.157 Although mechanics' lien statutes have problems,158 they are 
145. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-102 (2003). 
146. See SAMUELS, supra note 10, at 99-100; SWEET, supra note 7, at 640. 
147. 138 Md. App. 654, 658, 773 A.2d 573, 575-76 (2001). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-102; Judd Fire Prot., Inc., 138 Md. App. at 
665, 773 A.2d at 580. 
151. SeeJudd Fire Prot., Inc., 138 Md. App. at 658,665-66,773 A.2d at 575-76,580. 
152. See generally SWEET, supra note 7, at 643. 
153. Judd Fire Prot., Inc., 138 Md. App. at 665, 773 A.2d at 580. 
154. See generally MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-102;JuddFireProt., Inc., 138 Md. 
App. at 665, 773 A.2d at 580. 
155. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2707 (1989). 
156. See Judd Fire Prot., Inc., 138 Md. App. at 660, 773 A.2d at 577. 
157. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. 
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intended to ensure that owners do not benefit at the expense of labor-
ers and materialmen. 159 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Judd Fire Protection, Inc. pro-
tects those who have worked hard to do their jobs regardless of titles, 
privity with others, contracts of third parties, and payments given but 
not received.160 Certain people may consider the court's interpreta-
tion of Maryland's mechanics' liens statute in Judd Fire Protection, Inc. 
unfair to owners. This one-sided view, however, ignores the purpose 
of this statute-providing just compensation for the laborers and ma-
terialmen who have arduously performed their duties. 161 
A nee P. Raulerson 
158. See supra Part IILe. 
159. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
160. See supra Part lILA-C. 
161. See supra Part IILA-e. 
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APPENDIX 
Subtitle 1. Mechanics' Liens 
§ 9-101. DeFmitions. 
(a) In general. - In this subtitle the following words have the 
meanings indicated. 
(b) Building. - ''Building'' includes any unit of a nonresidential 
buil9ing that is leased or separately sold as a unit. 
(c) Contract. - ''Contract'' means an agreement of any kind or 
nature, express or implied, for doing work or furnishing material, or 
both, for or about a building as may give rise to a lien under this 
subtitle. 
(d) Contractor. - "Contractor" means a person who has a contract 
with an owner. 
(e) Land. - ''Land'' means the land to which a lien extends under 
this subtitle or the land within the boundaries established by 
proceedings in accordance with the Maryland Rules. "Land" includes 
the improvements to the land. 
(f) Owner. - "Owner" means the owner of the land except that, 
when the contractor executes the contract with a tenant for life or for 
years, "owner" means the tenant. 
(g) Subcontractor. - 'Subcontractor" means a person who has a 
contract with anyone except the owner or his agent. 
§ 9-102. Property subject to lien. 
(a) Buildings. - Every building erected and every building repaired, 
rebuilt, or improved to the extent of 15 percent of its value is subject 
to establishment of a lien in accordance with this subtitle for the 
payment of all debts, without regard to the amount, contracted for 
work done for or about the building and for materials furnished for 
or about the building, including the drilling and installation of wells 
to supply water, the construction or installation of any swimming pool 
or fencing, the sodding, seeding or planting in or about the premises 
of any shrubs, trees, plants, flowers or nursery products, the grading, 
filling, landscaping, and paving of the premises, and the leasing of 
equipment, with or without an operator, for use for or about the 
building or premises. 
(b) Waterlines, sewers, drains and streets in development. - If the owner 
of land or the owner's agent contracts for the installation of 
waterlines, sanitary sewers, storm drains, or streets to service all lots in 
a development of the owner's land, each lot and its improvements, if 
any, are subject, on a basis pro rata to the number of lots being 
developed, to the establishment of a lien as provided in subsection (a) 
of this section for all debts for work and material in connection with 
the installation. 
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(c) Machines, wharves, and bridges. - Any machine, wharf, or bridge 
erected, constructed, or repaired within the State may be subjected to 
a lien in the same manner as a building is subjected to a lien in 
accordance with this subtitle. 
(d) Exemptions. - However, a building or the land on which the 
building is erected may not be subjected to a lien under this subtitle 
if, prior to the establishment of a lien in accordance with this subtitle, 
legal title has been granted to a bona fide purchaser for value. 
(e) Filing of petition constitutes notice to purchaser. - The filing of a 
petition under § 9-105 shall constitute notice to a purchaser of the 
possibility of a lien being perfected under this subtitle. 
§ 9-103. Extent of lien. 
(a) In general. - A lien established in accordance with this subtitle 
shall extend to the land covered by the building and to as much other 
land, immediately adjacent and belonging in like manner to the 
owner of the building, as may be necessary for the ordinary and useful 
purposes of the building. The quantity and boundaries of the land 
may be designated as provided in this section. 
(b) Designation of boundaries. - An owner of any land who desires to 
erect any building or to contract with any person for its erection may 
define, in writing, the boundaries of the land appurtenant to the 
building before the commencement of construction, and then file the 
boundaries for record with the clerk of the circuit court for the 
county. The designation of boundaries shall be binding on all 
persons. If the boundaries are not designated before the 
commencement of a building, the owner of the land or any person 
having a lien or encumbrance on the land by mortgage, judgment, or 
otherwise entitled to establish a lien in accordance with this subtitle 
may apply, by written petition, to the circuit court for the county to 
designate the boundaries. 
(c) Unfinished building; repaired or rebuilt building. - (1) If a building 
is commenced and not finished, a lien established in accordance with 
this subtitle shall attach to the extent of the work done or material 
furnished. 
(2) If a building is erected, or repaired, rebuilt or improved to 
the extent of 25 percent of its value, by a tenant for life or years or by 
a person employed by the tenant, any lien established in accordance 
with this subtitle applies only to the extent of the tenant's interest. 
§ 9-104. Notice to owner by subcontractor. 
(a) Notice required to entitle subcontractor to lien. - (1) A subcontractor 
doing work or furnishing materials or both for or about a building 
other than a single family dwelling being erected on the owner's land 
for his own residence is not entitled to a lien under this subtitle 
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unless, within 120 days after doing the work or furnishing the 
materials, the subcontractor gives written notice of an intention to 
claim a lien substantially in the form specified in subsection (b) of this 
section. 
(2) A subcontractor doing work or furnishing materials or 
both for or about a single family dwelling being erected on the 
owner's land for his own residence is not entitled to a lien under this 
subtitle unless, within 120 days after doing work or furnishing 
materials for or about that single family dwelling, the subcontractor 
gives written notice of an intention to claim a lien in accordance with 
subsection (a) (1) of this section and the owner has not made full 
payment to the contractor prior to receiving the notice. 
(b) Form of notice. - The form of notice is sufficient for the purposes 
of this subtitle if it contains the information required ... 
(c) Notice by mail or personal delivery. - The notice is effective if given 
by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, or personally 
delivered to the owner by the claimant or his agent. 
(d) More than one owner. - If there is more than one owner, the 
subcontractor may comply with this section by giving the notice to any 
of the owners. 
(e) Notice by posting. - If notice cannot be given on account of 
absence or other causes, the subcontractor, or his agent, in the 
presence of a competent witness and within 120 days, may place the 
notice on the door or other front part of the building. Notice by 
posting according to this subsection is sufficient in all cases where the 
owner of the property has died and his successors in title do not 
appear on the public records of the county. 
(f) Payments by owner to contractor after notice; limitation on lien against 
certain single family dwellings. - (1) On receipt of notice given under 
this section, the owner may withhold, from sums due the contractor, 
the amount the owner ascertains to be due the subcontractor giving 
the notice. 
(2) If the subcontractor giving notice establishes a lien in 
accordance with this subtitle, the contractor shall receive only the 
difference between the amount due him and that due the 
subcontractor giving the notice. 
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the 
contrary, the lien of the subcontractor against a single family dwelling 
being erected on the land of the owner for his own residence shall not 
exceed the amount by which the owner is indebted under the 
contract at the time the notice is given. 
§ 9-105. Filing of claims. 
(a) In general. - In order to establish a lien under this subtitle, a 
person entitled to a lien shall file proceedings in the circuit court for 
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the county where the land or any part of the land is located within 180 
days after the work has been finished or the materials furnished. The 
proceedings shall be commenced by filing with the clerk, the 
following: 
(1) A petition to establish the mechanic's lien, which shall set 
forth at least the following: 
(i) The name and address of the petitioner; 
(ii) The name and address of the owner; 
(iii) The nature or kind of work done or the kind and 
amount of materials furnished, the time when the work was done or 
the materials furnished, the name of the person for whom the work 
was done or to whom the materials were furnished and the amount or 
sum claimed to be due, less any credit recognized by the petitioner; 
(iv) A description of the land, including a statement 
whether part of the land is located in another county, and a 
description adequate to identify the building; and 
(v) If the petitioner is a subcontractor, facts showing that 
the notice required under § 9-104 of this subtitle was properly mailed 
or served upon the owner, or, if so authorized, posted on the 
building. If the lien is sought to be established against two or more 
buildings on separate lots or parcels of land owned by the same 
person, the lien will be postponed to other mechanics' liens unless 
the petitioner designates the amount he claims is due him on each 
building; 
(2) An affidavit by the petitioner or some person on his behalf, 
setting forth facts upon which the petitioner claims he is entitled to 
the lien in the amount specified; and 
(3) Either original or sworn, certified or photostatic copies of 
material papers or parts thereof, if any, which constitute the basis of 
the lien claim, unless the absence thereof is explained in the affidavit. 
(b) Docketing; process; pleadings. - The clerk shall docket the 
proceedings as an action in equity, and all process shall issue out of 
and all pleadings shall be filed in the one action. 
§ 9-106. Procedure following riling of claim. 
(a) Review oj pleadings and documents filed; order to show cause; opposing 
affidavit; answer showing cause. - (1) When a petition to establish a 
mechanic's lien is filed, the court shall review the pleadings and 
documents on file and may require the petitioner to supplement or 
explain any of the matters therein set forth. If the court determine 
that the lien should attach, it shall pass an order that direct the owner 
to show cause within 15 days from the date of service on the owner of 
a copy of the order, together copies of the pleadings and documents 
on file, why a lien upon the land or building and for the amount 
118 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 33 
described in the petition should not attach. Additionally, the order 
shall inform the owner that: 
(i) He may appear at the time stated in the order present 
evidence in his behalf or may file a counteraffidavit at or before that 
time; and 
(ii) If he fails to appear and present evidence or file a 
counteraffidavit, the facts in the affidavit supporting the petitioner's 
claim shall be deemed admitted and a lien may attach to the land or 
buildings described in the petition. 
(2) If the owner desires to controvert any statement of fact 
contained in the affidavit supporting the petitioner's claim, he must 
file an affidavit in support of his answer showing cause. The failure to 
file such opposing affidavit shall constitute an admission for the 
purposes of the proceedings of all statements of fact in the affidavit 
supporting the petitioner's claim, but shall not constitute an 
admission that such petition or affidavit in support thereof is legally 
sufficient 
(3) An answer showing cause why a lien should not be 
established in the amount claimed shall be set down for hearing at the 
earliest possible time. 
(b) Final order; interlocutory order. - (1) If the pleadings, affidavits and 
admissions on file, and the evidence, if any, show that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the lien should attach 
as a matter of law, then a final order shall be entered establishing the 
lien for want of any cause shown to the contrary. Further, if it appears 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any portion of the lien claim, 
then the validity of that portion shall be established and the action 
shall proceed only on the disputed amount of the lien claim. 
(2) If the pleadings, affidavits and admissions on file and the 
evidence, if any, show that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and that the petitioner failed to establish his right to a 
lien as a matter of law, then a final order shall be entered denying the 
lien for cause shown. 
(3) If the court determines from the pleadings, affidavits and 
admissions on file, and the evidence, if any, that the lien should not 
attach, or should not attach in the amount claimed, as a matter of law, 
by any final order, but that there is probable cause to believe the 
petitioner is entitled to a lien, the court shall enter an interlocutory 
order which: 
(i) Establishes the lien; 
(ii) Describes the boundaries of the land and the buildings 
to which the lien attaches; 
(iii) States the amount of the claim for which probable 
cause is found; 
2003] Maryland's Mechanics' Liens Statute 119 
(iv) Specifies the amount of a bond that the owner may 
file to have the land and building released from the lien; 
(v) May require the claimant to file a bond in an amount 
that the court believes sufficient for damages, including reasonable 
attorney's fees; and 
(vi) Assigns a date for the trial of all the matters at issue in 
the action, which shall be within a period of six months. The owner 
or any other person interested in the property, however, may, at any 
time, move to have the lien established by the interlocutory order 
modified or dissolved. 
(c) Bond. - The amount of and the surety on any bond shall be 
determined and approved pursuant to the Maryland Rules except as 
set forth in this subtitle. The petitioner, or any other person 
interested in the property, however, if not satisfied with the sufficiency 
of a surety or with the amount of any bond given, may, at any time 
before entry of a final decree, apply to the court for an order 
requiring an additional bond, and upon notice to the other parties 
involved, the court may order the giving of such additional bond as it 
may deem proper. In lieu of filing bond, any party may deposit 
money in an amount equal to the amount of the bond which would 
otherwise be required, pursuant to the Maryland Rules. 
(d) Trial on matters at issue. - Until a final order is entered either 
establishing or denying the lien, the action shall proceed to trial on all 
matters at issue, as in the case of any other proceedings in equity. 
§ 9-107. Attachment of lien to land in another county. 
(a) Filing of documents with clerk. - If any part of the land is located 
within another county and the petitioner desires that the lien attach 
to the land in that county, the petitioner shall file a certified copy of 
the docket entries, of the court order, and of any required bond with 
the clerk of the circuit court for that county. 
(b) Time of attachment. - A lien attaches to the land or building in a 
county as of the time the documents required to be filed under 
subsection (a) ... are filed with the clerk of the circuit court of that 
county. 
§ 9-108. Sale under foreclosure or execution of land against which 
lien established. 
If all or any part of the land or buildings against which a mechanic's 
lien has been established pursuant to this subtitle shall be sold under 
foreclosure or a judgment, execution or any other court order, all 
liens and encumbrances on such property shall be satisfied in 
accordance with their priority, subject to the limitation in the next 
sentence of this section. If the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to 
satisfy all liens established pursuant to this subtitle, then all proceeds 
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available to satisfy each such lien shall be stated by the court auditor as 
one fund, and the amount to be disbursed to satisfy each lien 
established pursuant to this subtitle shall bear the same proportion to 
that fund as the amount of such lien bears to the total amount 
secured by all such liens, without regard to priority among such liens. 
§ 9-109. Expiration of right to enforce lien. 
The right to enforce any lien established under this subtitle expires 
at the end of one year from the day on which the petition to establish 
the lien was first filed. During this time the claimant may file a 
petition in the lien proceedings to enforce the lien or execute on any 
bond given to obtain a release of the land and building from the lien. 
If such petition is filed within the one-year period, the right to a lien 
or the lien, or any bond given to obtain a release of lien, shall remain 
in full force and effect until the conclusion of the enforcement 
proceedings and thereafter only in accordance with the decree 
entered in the case. 
§ 9-110. No waiver by giving credit or taking security. 
No person having the right to establish a mechanics' lien waives the 
right by granting a credit, or receiving a note or other security, unless 
it is received as payment or the lien right is expressly waived. 
§ 9-111. Right to institute personal action. 
Nothing in this subtitle affects the right of any person, to whom any 
debt is due for work done or material furnished, to maintain any 
personal action against the owner of the building or any other person 
liable for the debt. 
§ 9-112. Subtitle a remedial law; amendment to proceedings. 
This law is remedial and shall be so construed to give effect to its 
purpose. Any amendment shall be made in the proceedings, 
commencing with the claim or lien to be filed and extending to all 
subsequent proceedings, as may be necessary and proper. However, 
the amount of the claim or lien filed may not be enlarged by 
amendment. 
§ 9-113. Prohibited provisions in executory contracts. 
(a) In general. - An executory contract between a contractor and 
any subcontractor that is related to construction, alteration, or repair 
of a building, structure, or improvement may not waive or require the 
subcontractor to waive the right to: 
(1) Claim a mechanics' lien; or 
(2) Sue on a contractor's bond. 
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(b) Provisions conditioning payment to subcontractor on payment of 
contractor. - A provision in an executory contract between a contractor 
and a subcontractor that is related to construction, alteration, or 
repair of a building, structure, or improvement and that conditions 
payment to the subcontractor on receipt by the contractor of payment 
from the owner or any other third party may not abrogate or waive the 
right of the subcontractor to: 
(1) Claim a mechanics' lien; or 
(2) Sue on a contractor's bond. 
(c) Void provisions. - Any provision of a contract made in violation 
of this section is void as against the public policy of this State. 
§ 9-114. Releases from material suppliers and subcontractors. 
(a) Signed release of lien. - At the time of settlement or payment in 
full between a contractor and an owner, the contractor shall give to 
the owner a signed release of lien from each material supplier and 
subcontractor who provided work or materials under the contract. 
(b) Effect of signed release. - An owner is not subject to a lien and is 
not otherwise liable for any work or materials included in the release 
under subsection (a) of this section. 
